Pondering the question of "style" in historiographical narration, Hannah Arendt notes: "The question of style is bound up with the problem of understanding which has plagued the historical sciences almost from their beginnings."
"Hell" (R, 79). To recapitulate the context briefl y, Arendt distinguishes three types of concentration camps, each corresponding to one of the three basic Western conceptions of life after death: Hades, Purgatory, and Hell. Hades, Arendt explains, is represented by those "relatively mild" camps for displacing "undesirable elements of all sorts-refugees, stateless persons, the asocial and the unemployed." After those so-called displaced-persons camps, she lists the Soviet Union's labor camps, metaphorized as Purgatory, "where neglect is combined with chaotic forced labor." Hell, "in the most literal sense," is embodied by those camps perfected by the Nazis "in which the whole of life was thoroughly and systematically organized with a view to the greatest possible torment" (O, 445; E, 918-19). 2 Arendt frequently turns to the Nazi extermination camps, the site of Hell, as it is here that both the nature of human beings, on the threshold between life and death, and the nature of totalitarian regimes can be studied. 3 Arendt also dwells on the metaphor of Hell in explaining her rather idiosyncratic style vis-à-vis possible approaches in line with the positivistic paradigm. Hell is a biblical metaphor with a distinct moral connotation. Arendt explains that she parted quite consciously with the tradition of sine ira et studio (without indignation or partisanship), for describing a phenomenon like the extermination camps without indignation would mean to deprive them of an inherent dimension. Rather than suggest detached scholarly rigor, it would imply the dismissal of an integral element of these camps. The Nazis' extermination camps existed "in the midst of human society." "To describe the concentration camps sine ira," Arendt writes, "is not to be 'objective,' but to condone them; and such condoning cannot be changed by a condemnation which the author may feel duty bound to add but which remains unrelated to the description itself" (R, 79). Since all that happened took place among human beings, and since human beings are by defi nition ethical beings, who, in contradistinction to animals, assume an understanding of justice, the question of ethics is intrinsic rather 2. Arendt wrote and published The Origins of Totalitarianism fi rst in English in 1951; it appeared in German four years later. The German edition, however, is not a translation sensu stricto but is revised, rhetorically sharpened, and often elaborated. All citations are therefore based on the German edition. Despite all evidence, "understanding lacks the guiding threads of indubitable proofs." How are we to understand this paradox?
The "Discovery" of the Lie Arendt considers the "discovery" of the lie one of the Nazis' greatest "achievements," in that the immensity of their crimes guaranteed that the murderers, who "proclaim their innocence with all manner of lies," will be more readily believed than the victims, whose "truths" offend any sane listener's common sense:
Hitler circulated millions of copies of his book in which he stated that to be successful, a lie must be enormous, i.e., when you are not content to lie about individual factual data within a factual context that is left intact, whereby the intact facts already uncover the lie, but instead cast such a web of lies around the entire factuality that all the individual constituent facts replace the real by a fi ctional world, coherent in itself. (O, 439; E, 909-10) Arendt speaks here of an "entire factuality," a "real" world substituted for a "fi ctional" world-an analysis that in the later essay "Truth and Politics" (1967) leads her to classify totalitarianism as a "modern lie": "The modern political lies are so big that they require a complete rearrangement of the whole factual texture-the making of another reality, as it were, into which they fi t without seam, crack or fi ssure" (TP, 253). The modern lie thus epitomizes the paradox of a lie so enormous that, in a narrow sense, it no longer can be called a "lie." For what distinguishes the "lie" from an "error" or a "mistake" is of course its intentionality, the deliberateness of the falsifi cation. In the case of selfdeception, this intentionality is no longer given. At the same time, Arendt's nominal classifi cation of the modern lie does, as we shall see, harbor some explanatory potential for the phenomenon of collective mendacity. 13 To be 13. Benjamin calls this feature of societal mendacity "objektive Verlogenheit" (objective mendacity) and deems it a phenomenon that "dominates world-historically in our time." In "Remarks on 'Objective Mendacity'" (written about 1921) he explains: "Warum 'objektive' Verlogenheit? 1) Sie herrscht objektiv weltgeschichtlich in dieser Zeit. Alles was nicht ganz groß ist, ist in unser Zeit unecht. 2) Es ist nicht die subjektiv, vom Einzelnen klar verantwortete Lüge. Sondern dieser ist 'bona fi de'" (Why "objective" mendacity? [1] It dominates objectively, world-historically in these times. Everything not great is considered unreal in our time. [2] It is not the subjective lie for which the individual would have to take responsibility. Rather, he is "bona fi sure, the concept of the modern lie, the notion of self-deception, is more than just an accompaniment to ideology. Arendt speaks about the question of ideology at length, attributing to it the analytic force of a modern, all-encompassing lie. While her motivation for this interpretive symbiosis will gradually emerge, for now I shall follow her on the argumentative path on ideology.
What distinguishes totalitarian ideology from authoritarianism, tyranny, despotism, and the like is its disjunction from reality. If we try to fathom the word ideo-logy, we are generally dealing with the logos of an idea. The pseudoscientifi c character of all ideologies, Arendt says, is based on the presupposition that an idea or a body of ideas-such as "Jews are inferior"-can become the subject matter of a science as animals are the subject matter of zoology (cf. O, 468; E, 962). What we must ask time and again is, what is the linguistic reality or referentiality of totalitarian domination vis-à-vis the linguistic reality or referentiality of Arendt's presentation of totalitarian domination?
